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Abstract. We propose a distinction between the physical and the mathe-
matical parts of gauge field theories. The main problem we face is to uphold a
strong and meaningful criterion of what is physical. We like to call it “Field’s
dilemma”, referring to Hartry Field’s nominalist proposal which we consider
to be inadaequate. The resolution to the dilemma, we believe, is implicitly
provided by the so-called fiber bundle formalism. We shall demonstrate, in de-
tail, that the bundle structure underlying modern quantum and gravitational
gauge field theories allows for a genuine distinction between the physically
significant and the merely mathematical parts of these theories.
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1 The emergence of “Field’s dilemma”
In his book Science without Numbers Hartry Field (1980) raises an important ontological issue.
We believe in the existence of theoretical entities, Field claims, because they are indispensable.
We need them in order to explain phenomena which need to be explained. However, our scientific
theories in general and physical theories in particular are formulated using, also, a mathematical
vocabulary: functions, transformations, integrals, derivatives and, of course, real and complex
numbers appear in the formulation of every theory in physics. And, it seems that these math-
ematical entities, too, are needed in order to construct explanations. Does it not follow, then,
that we should be committed to the existence of these seemingly indispensable mathematical
entities for the same reason that makes us believe in the reality of theoretical entities? The
answer, says Field, is that the “purely mathematical” part of physics is not truly indispensable
for explanatory purposes. Let T be the physical part of a theory and let S be its mathematical
part. If A is a physical fact which needs explanation, says Field, and it can be explained in
terms of S + T , it can be explained in terms of T alone. The inclusion of S is merely a matter
of convention. Hence, we do not have to worry about the ontology of its objects.
On this level of abstraction Field’s question strikes us as a very important one and his general
strategy for answering it seems promising. Indeed, it seems that a significant advancement in
our understanding of physics will be achieved if we could identify and characterize the part of
theoretical physics which stands for real physical processes and distinguish it from the merely
mathematical and, hence, the “contentless” part of physics to use Field’s own terminology. Our
next step, then, is to outline Field’s specific strategy. It is in this strategy that Field sees the
merit of his account.
Let T and S be, respectively, the “physical” and the “mathematical” parts of a theory.
Let A be a “nominalistically statable” assertion A (A is a statement whose quantifiers were
restricted to range only on non-mathematical objects). Field’s strategy for demonstrating that
S is dispensable is to prove that if A is a semantic consequence of S + T it is a consequence of
T alone. Such a demonstration establishes that S + T is a conservative extension of T , namely
that every model of S + T is also a model of T alone. Field claims that if T + S is proven to
be a conservative extension of T , S is thereby shown to be “contentless”; it does not place any
significant constraints on the models of T+S that could distinguish them from models of T alone.
Indeed, writes Field, “... it would be extremely surprising if it were discovered that standard
mathematics implied that there are 106 non-mathematical objects or that the Paris commune
was defeated; and were such discovery to be made all but unregenerate rationalists would take
this as showing that standard mathematics needed revision. Good mathematics is conservative.”
(Field, 1980, p. 13). Of course, says Field, we need to assume that standard mathematics is
consistent (otherwise S would not have any non-trivial models). This assumption, itself, cannot
be proven conclusively. However, we all believe that standard mathematics, being a very useful
theory, must be consistent. Once this assumption is made, says Field, it is relatively easy to
prove that standard mathematics is conservative: “Indeed, ... the gap between the claim of
consistency and the full claim of conservativeness is, in the case of standard mathematics, a
very tiny one.” (Field, 1980, p. 13). This is certainly an interesting observation. Regarding
the issue of the truth of mathematics Field claims that it is a mute point. Mathematics can be
considered true if mathematical entities are assumed to exist. The main reason for believing in
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the existence of mathematical objects, says Field, is that they are indispensable for explanatory
purposes. But since Field has supposedly shown that mathematical entities are not needed for
explaining physical facts he regards the issue of mathematical truth as being simply irrelevant.
A critique of Field’s argument necessitates a full discussion of his “nominalistic reconstruc-
tion” of various physical theories. This undertaking, however, is not necessary in the present
context; the critique of Field’s theory is not the main focus of this article. What we want to
present here is another way of answering Field’s question, namely, how to divide physics into
a “truly physical part” and a “merely mathematical” part and then demonstrate that the for-
mer should be regarded as representing real and objective phenomena while the latter is to
be regarded as dispensable “conceptual scaffolding”. The details of our analysis, though, are
significantly different. Firstly, the sense in which physical theories are divided into the physical
and the mathematical parts is completely different from the one Field employed. Field uses
logical tools to affect the decomposition; we, on the other hand, shall use the mathematics of
fiber bundles to formulate our constructions. Secondly, our characterization of what is physical
is quite different from Field’s. For our purposes the physical part of the theory is the one with
experimental consequences. This is a much stricter criterion than the one which underlines
Field’s argument. Because of our criterion we are led to consider the local gauge covariance
principle as the paradigm of what is physical. We believe that this feature of our account brings
us much closer to the physicist’s way of thinking. Finally, the method of proving that various
mathematical constructions are dispensable vary significantly from Field’s. First, we have noth-
ing that is analogous to the proof of conservative extension. We believe that what makes the
mathematical part of the theory different from the physical part is not that we can do without
it. Instead, one should show that a different choice of mathematical formulation would not have
led to a theory with different experimental consequences.
Ultimately, our account should be judged on its own merit; it is not even absolutely clear
that it is an alternative to Field’s approach and not a complimentary set of observations. We
do, however, believe that Field’s account suffers from some serious problems. Consequently, we
feel the need to “save” Field’s general strategy from the specific interpretation he assignes to it.
In this sense, and only in this sense, we are engaged in a critique of Field’s account.
The problems in Field’s account to which we alluded are the following:
(i) The formulations which Field offers to various physical theories do not have much to be
recommended for them, that is, apart from their value for the nominalist. Although
Field claims that his formulations yield “reasonably attractive” theories we believe that
physicists would find them quite objectionable.
(ii) The notion of semantic consequence which Field uses is an abstract and non-constructive
notion. He does not show us how to actually derive any “nominalistically statable” asser-
tion from T alone. Hence, such assertions do not, stricly speaking, receive an explanation
from T alone.
(iii) Field’s idea of the physical is quite inflationary. For instance, he regards spacetime points
as physical entities. In this respect his attempt to “physicalize geometry” is in stark
contrast to the general-relativistically motivated movement to “geometrize physics”.
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(iv) More generally, the very logic of Field’s argument mandates that he uses a very loose
and weak notion of the physical so that the resulting theory T will be powerful enough
to entail the consequences of T + S. This way of thinking is, again, in opposition to
the line of thinking of the physicist. As we remarked earlier, we believe that the term
physical assertion should be reserved only for those aspects of physics which have empirical
consequences.
(v) Finally we do not believe, like Field does, that we can do without mathematical concepts
altogether nor do we think that this is what we need to prove in order to characterize the
ontological difference between mathematical and physical entities. It might turn out that
we cannot proceed without some mathematical structures and notations. What we need
to demonstrate, in order to account for the difference between the mathematical and the
physical, is that had we chosen another mathematical “convention” or construction, the
experimentally testable part of the theory would have remained essentially unaffected. It
is this type of invariance with respect to the choice of mathematical description that allows
us to conclude that there is no need to interpret the “merely mathematical” entities of the
theory as physically real.
All these problems are quite troublesome. There is, however, one issue that seems to us to
deserve special attention. In discussing what criterion to use for what is uniquely a physical phe-
nomenon many philosophers would tend to favor a relatively rigid criterion; in particular, there
is, clearly, much to recommend about the idea that when we assert that a physical phenomenon
occurs, we must show that the assertion has empirical consequences. On the other hand, in the
interest of affecting a workable distinction between the “genuinely physical” and the “merely
mathematical”, some of the same philosophers might be susceptible to the pressure of employing
an inclusive criterion. In this context even a loose characterization of what is physical, if it yields
a distinction between mathematics and physics, seems preferable to no distinction at all. This
pressure is particularly strong for those who look for a proof that the merely mathematical part
of physics S is dispensible. By “smuggling” into the physical part T large portion of S + T one
obtains a relatively strong T and a relatively weak S, making it easier to prove that S + T is
a conservative extension of T . A similar motivation lurks behind much of what is attractive in
various forms of substantivalism. When one regards space-time points as physical entities one
leaves very little in the purely mathematical part of physics. This residue seems to play a merely
faciliatory role akin to that played by the logical connectives; therefore the inflationary criterion
for the physical leaves us with very little temptation to attach to it any ontological significance.
The price, though, is in our opinion much too high. Therefore, we shall try to find a way around
it.
To sum up, then, we are faced with a double pressure. On the one hand we would like to
employ a relatively restrictive criterion of what is physically significant; but on the other we
are pressured in the opposite direction to affect a distinction between the mathematical and the
physical parts. This is what we propose to call “Field’s dilemma”. A large portion of this
article is dedicated to show how to escape this dilemma, that is, how to uphold a restrictive
criterion of what is physical while making it possible to distinguish beween the mathematical
part of physics and its truly physical parts.
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Let us now describe the contents of this paper. Our main purpose is to present a new
conception of the ontology of gauge field theories (the most fundamental field theoretic approach
of physics today). This conception, we believe, is implicit in the fiber bundle formalism. The
construction of fiber bundles makes it possible to distinguish the “merely mathematical” aspects
of physical theories from their “truly physical” parts. From this aspect stems the importance
of fiber bundles for the discussion of the ontology of physical theories, as we see it. The gauge
principle has a precise and uniform representation in fiber bundle theoretic terms. Therefore,
a careful study of these structures will allow us to better understand this principle and to
distinguish between gauge principle and “merely mathematical” covariance principles.
To those who are acquainted with the bundle formalism there is no need to exalt its virtue
at length. It is enough to mention that, at least in principle, every physical field theory can be
given a specific formulation using the construction of the appropriate fiber bundle. Therefore,
one may think of the fiber bundle formalism as the lingua universalis of modern physics. The
basic ideas and definitions of bundle theory have been present in the mathematical literature for
well over fifty years. These ideas are classified under the headings of differential geometry and
algebraic topology, two disciplines which gave rise to some of the most important mathematical
developments of the twentieth century. However, the application of these ideas to physics are
much more recent. Only in the last two or three decades did the power of these methods, as
they apply to mathematical physics, become evident. Mathematical physicists who used them
managed to derive impressive results which could not have been obtained in other ways. Since
then the study of fiber bundles has become part of the standard education of young physicists.
These developments lend some urgency to the project of properly understanding the ideas behind
the fiber bundle formalism. The investigation of these ideas and their applications to physics
will occupy the center part of this paper.
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2 Fiber bundles
In this chapter we try to give a brief and self-contained introduction to the mathematics of fiber
bundles. Our key motivation is the idea of generalizing the direct product and its set theoretic
background; in the later section of this chapter we shall show the connection of this presentation
with more physics-oriented presentations such as Drechsler and Mayer (1977) and Trautman
(1984).
2.1 The direct product and its generalization
Of the many contributions of set theory to the foundations of mathematics the set-theoretic
definition of mathematical functions which emerged early in the development of set theory
stands as a milestone. Until the end of the 19th century mathematicians thought of functions
as rules of correspondence. That is, if x ∈ X is a member of the domain of f , the expression
f(x) was considered to be a procedure or a recipe to obtain y = f(x) from x. As a consequence,
in order to determine whether y = f(x) or not, one had to inquire into the meaning of the
instruction underlying f . Such inquiries, by definition, cannot be completely precise; therefore,
a need was felt for a more rigorous definition of the concept of a mathematical function.
As the reader undoubtedly knows, in set theory the function f : X→ Y is identified with its
“graph” Gf , that is, with the set of all ordered pairs
1 (x, y) such that f(x) = y (note that Gf is
a subset of the direct product X×Y). Hence, the question of whether y = f(x) can be answered
by simply checking that (x, y) ∈ Gf ; imprecise “instructions” and “rules of correspondence” are
banished from the ontology of mathematics. If f is a well defined function, Gf is a well defined
set and the question whether or not (x, y) ∈ Gf has an unambiguous answer.
As a result of the following considerations, rather than investigating f , we may investigate
the relations between X,Y and X×Y. More precisely, we investigate
X × Y
πx ւ ց πy
X Y
(1)
where πx(x, y) = x and πy(x, y) = y. πx and πy are called projections. In view of the founda-
tional significance of the direct product construction it should be interesting for philosophers of
mathematics to find out how it can be generalized. Indeed, this is the motivating idea behind
the fiber bundle formalism. As we shall see shortly, the generalization of the direct product can
be viewed as yet another conception of the nature of mathematical functions.
The fundamental idea of the fiber bundle construction is to continue investigating X, Y,
X×Y and πx but to give up πy, the projection into Y. What could be a reason for giving up
πy? The idea is that Y has an “additional layer of hidden structure” which is “indispensable”,
that is, in order to determine the values of f this layer of structure has to be taken into account.
Therefore, an adequate representation of the situation should make the dependence on this layer
of structure explicit. Let us think of the above mentioned layer of structure as a group G which
1An ordered pair can be identified with a simple set using, for example, the convention (x, y) = {x, {y}}.
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operates2 on Y. We get
X × Y
πx ւ
X G×Y→ Y
(2)
instead of (1). Now let x ∈ X and let Yx = π−1x (x) (Yx is called the fiber over x). Let us now
define a family of maps Yx → Y. If G is generated by a single element g all the elements of
Y are in one equivalence class and each of the elements of X is assigned with Yx, an identical
copy of Y. If G is generated by more than one element for every generating element of G we
shall have another map Yx → Y (in other words, the assignment of Yx, the fiber over x, is
“sensitive” to the operation of G on Y).
2.2 The definition of fiber bundles
This somewhat imprecise description will allow us to give the reader a primary concept of fiber
bundles and an idea of the way they generalize the direct product. A fiber bundle is a structure
〈E,B, π,F, G〉 which includes
(i) The bundle space (or total space) E
(ii) The base space B
(iii) The fiber space F
(iv) A mapping π : E→ B called projection
(v) A group G called structure group with a left action on F
As we remarked Fx = π
−1(x) is called the fiber over x ∈ B.
Let us turn now to the issue of the generalization of the direct product. Is it, indeed, a
genuine generalization? If the point, where the definition of fiber bundles departs from that
of the garden variety of direct products, is whenever the “hidden structure” over Y, which is
represented by the action of the group G, is taken into account, why can’t we simply define the
quotient space3 Y/G and a function f ′ : X → Y/G which is to be investigated instead of f?
Note that if we want to claim that behind the fiber bundle formalism there is a new conception
of mathematical functions there is some urgency to answer this question in a convincing way.
Is the fomalism we develop a genuinely new idea or is it merely a hyphaluted mathematical
notation?
There are two reasons for believing that we are engaged in a genuinely new body of ideas.
First, as we shall see shortly, not every fiber bundle is equivalent (in a precise mathematical
sense which we shall define soon) to a direct product. Secondly, the “hidden structure”, which
2We can think of the operation of G as an equivalence relation ∼ which is defined on Y. If y = gy′ with g ∈ G,
then y ∼g y
′. In general, this equivalence relation “decomposes” Y into equivalence classes, one for each of the
elements which generate G. Each of the equivalence classes is the G-orbit of its members.
3The construction of Y/G can be described as a choice of the “representative element” from each of the
equivalent classes of Y induced by G.
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is coded by the action of the group G, should not be ignored; but we should not give up Y and
concentrate only on Y/G either. As we shall see later the invariance with respect to the action
of G often represents highly non-trivial physical facts. Thus, we should be prepared to retain
the “superfluous structure” of Y and think of G-covariance as a physical principle. If we rid
ourselves of the “excess structure” too quickly we shall not be able to appreciate the difference
between this covariance with respect to G and other more trivial kinds of covariance without a
physical meaning. The full significance of the last remarks will become clearer when we discuss
some physical examples.
2.3 Different types of fiber bundles
2.3.1 Sections and coordinate bundles
For a direct product, i.e. a structure 〈X,Y,X×Y, πx, πy〉, the following construction is always
possible: let y0 ∈ Y and
Xy0 = {(x, y) : πy(x, y) = y0} . (3)
The set Xy0 is always well defined. Xy0 is called a global section of X×Y. If Xy and Xy′ are
global sections corresponding to y, y′ ∈ Y, there is a natural isomorphism ϕy,y′ : Xy0 → Xy0,
(x, y) → (x, y′). There is also a natural isomorphism ϕy : X → Xy between X and Xy,
x → (x, y). Hence we may regard the various Xy as “copies” of X attached to the various
y ∈ Y. In case we give up πy, we give up the possibility of always having global sections
at our disposal. Instead we make a weaker requirement, namely, that for every x ∈ X there
is a neighborhood Ux such that in the “sub-bundle” Ux × Y we can construct local sections.
This requirement is called a local trivialization. As we shall see shortly the local trivialization
requirement is, indeed, a weaker condition which does not always guarantee the existence of
global sections.
Let us describe with some detail how to construct fiber bundles which satisfy the local
trivialization condition. In such cases, each point of the base space is contained in an open
neighborhood U such that the portion of the bundle “above” U is isomorphic to a direct product.
Note that in order to define such a fiber bundle we must confine our attention to those cases
where the notion of an open neighborhood is well defined, that is, to differentiable manifolds or,
at least, to topological spaces.
Recall that a chart on a topological spaceM is a homeomorphism f : U → V of U ⊂M , an
open set, onto an open subset V ⊂ Rn (n is called the dimension of f). An atlas is a collection of
charts whose domains cover M. M is an n-dimensional manifold if it admits an n-dimensional
atlas. Consider two charts f : U → V and f ′ : U ′ → V ′ on an n-dimensional manifold M. We
say that f and f ′ are C∞ compatible if the composit maps f ◦ f ′ −1 : f(U ∩ U ′) → (U ∩ U ′)
and f ′ ◦ f−1 : (U ∩ U ′) → (U ∩ U ′) are of class C∞ (that is, they have well defined partial
derivatives of all orders.) An atlas is of class C∞ if all its charts are pairwise C∞ compatible.
The construction of a C∞ atlas shows how to introduce a coordinate system into a topological
space. We use local charts to “import” into M the coordinate system of Rn; these coordinates
enable us to assign the objects of M a location. The fact that the charts are C∞ compatible
guarantees a “smooth” transition from one coordinate patch to another.
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Using an analogous procedure we can show how to construct a fiber bundle from local
patches. Let B be the base manifold and {Un} a collection of subsets of B which cover B.
Let E be a fiber bundle with B as the base space, F the “typical fiber” and π : E → B a
projection. Observe that for all n, π−1(Un) is a subset of E (clearly
⋃
n π
−1(Un) covers E). If
we restrict our attention to locally trivial bundles we can assume that there is a diffeomorphism
φn : π
−1(Un) → Un × Fn where π−1(Un) is a subset of E and Fn is the fiber associated with
some b ∈ Un. Now consider two patches Un and Um with a non empty intersection. Let φnm
be the restriction of φn to the π
−1(Un ∩ Um), that is φnm : π−1(Un ∩ Um) → (Un ∩ Um) × Fn.
Similarly let φm : π
−1(Um)→ Um ×Fm and let φmn : π−1(Um ∩ Un)→ (Um ∩Un)×Fm be the
restriction of φm to π
−1(Un ∩ Um). Let us now define the composit diffeomorphism ρnm
ρmn = φnm ◦ φ−1mn : (Un ∩ Um)×Fn → (Um ∩ Un)×Fm, (4)
which is called the transition function between the bundle charts φnm and φmn.
Let us now consider three open patches Un, Um and Ul and restrict our attention to the
intersection Un∩Um∩Ul. We need to know how to switch from one location to another. To this
end we will define the transition functions ρnm, ρml and ρnl which correspond to the transitions
Un → Um, Um → Ul and Un → Ul respectively. The transition from one coordinate patch to
another should not depend on the path. Hence we require that
ρnm ◦ ρml = ρnl. (5)
This condition which is called the cocycle condition, makes it possible to define, for each transi-
tion, a unique inverse transition. As we shall see shortly the cocycle condition allows us to code
the various transition functions as elements of a structure group G. More precisely the condition
makes it possible to associate with each g ∈ G the inverse element g−1 such that gg−1 = id.
To sum up, suppose that we are given a manifold B with an open cover {Un} and we assign
to each b ∈ Un the fiber Fn. Suppose further that for each n,m we can define the transition
function ρnm and that the collection of such function satisfies the cocycle condition. In such
a case we can define a fiber bundle E by patching together the sets Un × Fn by means of the
transition functions ρnm. It can be shown that E, thus obtained, is a metrizable separable and
locally compact space. In fact, E is, itself, a differentiable manifold; the domains of the charts
of E are Un ×F. π : E→ B is defined on each chart as a projection on the first element of the
product.
2.3.2 Principal bundles and associated vector bundles
Our next step is to construct principal fiber bundles where the action of the structure group is
explicit. We shall do so by requiring that each of the fibers can be identified with the group G.
In more pedestrian cases one must distinguish between G, taken as a set of operations which can
be composed with one another and the domain of objects on which the members of G operate.
However, in the present case we are considering mathematical objects with a dual character.
On the one hand we are dealing with a topological space, on the other hand each g ∈ G is an
operation. The composition G × G → G is defined as (g1, g2) → g1g−12 . It is required to be
continuous with respect to the product topology on G×G. If G has, in addition, the structure
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of a differentiable manifold, then it is natural to require that the composition is smooth. When
this requirement is satisfied G is called a Lie group. Another requirement on G is that it acts
freely; that means that it does not have non-trivial fixed points.
A principal bundle P is a structure 〈P, G,B, π〉 where P is a manifold on which the group
G acts freely. The projection π : P → B is a C∞ function from P onto B. P is assumed to
fulfil the local trivialization condition: for every b ∈ B there is an open set U ⊂ B and an
isomorphism f : U ×G→ π−1(U) such that for every b ∈ U and g, g′ ∈ G we get π(f(b, g)) = b
and f(b, gg′) = f(b, g)g′. Note that a tight connection exists between the projection π and the
orbits of G. All the elements of P which are projected onto the same b ∈ U are transformed into
one another by the elements of G. In other words, the fibers of P are the orbits of G and, at
the same time, the set of elements which are projected onto the same b ∈ U . This observation
motivates calling the action of the group “vertical” and the base manifold “horizontal”. We
shall explain this choice of terminology further shortly.
As we remarked earlier the requirement of local trivialization is not sufficient to guarantee
that the fiber bundle is mathematically trivial. To clarify this point let us state necessary and
sufficient conditions for a fiber bundle to be trivial. In the case of principal fiber bundles these
conditions are rather intuitive. Recall that a section of P is a diffeomorphism s : B → P such
that πs = id. Now, P is isomorphic to the trivial bundle 〈B × G,G,B, π〉 if and only if it
admits a global section. Indeed, consider the map f : P→ B×G defined by f−1(b, g) = s(b)g
for all b ∈ B, g ∈ G. f is a C∞ bijection and, hence, an isomorphism. Note that, as far as
principal bundles are concerned, the base manifold can be considered as the quotient P/G. This
point of view is equivalent to the construction using coordinate patches. Historically, it was not
immediately evident that that the definition of principal fiber bundles in terms of coordinate
patches is equivalent to defining them in terms of a quotient space.
To facillitate our understanding of the notion of mathematically trival fiber bundle let us
take two examples. The base space, in both cases, is a circle S1 with two coordinate patches U
and U ′ (in order to cover a circle we need, at least, two patches). The fiber is, in both examples,
the unit interval [0, 1]. In the first example the structure group G has two generators e and r. e
is an infintesimal translation and r is a rotation of the unit interval around its center. Because of
the action of r after a full circle the unit interval will be rotated by 180 degrees. Thus, the zero
point will be identified with the other pole 1 and, vice versa, 1 will be identified with 0. As a
consequence the construction will result in a Mo¨bius strip, a non-trivial fiber bundle which does
not admit a global section. In the second case the structure group G′ has only one generator: the
infintesimal shift e. The result, in this case, is a cylindrical fiber bundle; the cylinder is a trivial
fiber bundle which admits sections (however, as we shall discuss later in greater detail, bundles
which are trivial mathematically might be far from trivial from a physical point of view).
Once we have defined a principal fiber bundle we can make an extra step and construct fiber
bundles which are associated with the principal bundle. The general idea is to represent the
structure group in another structure (which is intended to be used as a “typical fiber”), and
assign copies of this structure to the points in the base space of the principal bundle. Because
the main focus of this paper is not purely mathematical, rather then defining an associated fiber
bundle in the most general way we shall define the vector bundle associated with a principal
bundle. One example of an associated vector bundle is the tangent bundle. Vector bundles
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appear frequently in physical applications. Let V be a vector space of dimension n, then, a
representation of G in V is a mapping
ρ : G×V→ V, (6)
(g, v) → v′ defines the action of G on V. Let P × G
V
= (P ×V)/G. Now we can define the
structure 〈P × G
V
, G,B, π〉 to be the vector bundle E associated with the principal bundle P.
When we assign to each point p ∈M its tangent space Tp, the union
⋃
Tp is the tangent bundle
TM over the base manifold M. We shall discuss the tangent bundle further shortly.
2.4 Connections on a principal fiber bundle
Connections are needed in order to formulate a “law” which determines how various objects are
transported from one point of a manifold to another. Even when we know how objects evolve
along the base manifold (that is, if we know the spatiotemporal coordinates of the evolution),
we still need to determine the evolution along the bundle manifold. Hence, we need a method
or a principle telling us how to “lift” a curve from the base manifold to the fiber bundle. Such
a principle should enable us to define the notion of parallel transport. We shall discuss how to
formulate these notions for a vector bundle associated with a principal bundle. This formulation
is not the most general one but it contains most of the ideas one encounters in the physics of
fiber bundles.
Now, we shall think of P as the bundle of linear frames LM. Let u ∈ P and p ∈ M such
that π(u) = p. We wish to transport a vector from its origin at p to neighboring points along
vectors emenating from p. Let v ∈ TpM be such a vector (TpM is the collection of vectors
tangent to p ∈M). We expect the law of transport to fulfil the following conditions:
(i) It should depend smoothly on p (that is, if p′ is infintesimally near p the evolution from
p′ can be expressed as an infintesimal variation on the evolution from p).
(ii) The law should allow us to define the parallel transport along any vector v ∈ TpM.
(iii) If v is transported from u to u′ then, if g ∈ G, ug should be transported to u′g.
Formally, in order to establish a connection, a vector space HuP ⊂ TuP must be assigned to
every u ∈ P (TuP is the vector space of the tangents at u, that is, TuP ∈ TP). The conditions
(i)-(iii) can now be formulated more precisely.
(i)* The assignment must be smooth.
(ii)* Let us define Θuπ : HuP → Tpi(u)M. We require that Θuπ is an isomorphism for every
u ∈ P.
(iii)* The assignment should be invariant with respect to the action of G: if g ∈ G and Φg(HuP)
is the result of the action of g on the members of HuP then ΘuΦg(HuP) = HugP.
Note that the isomorphism Θuπ allows us to “lift” any vector v ∈ TpM to a unique vector in
TP. More precisely, if π(u) = p and v ∈ TpM we may define the lift λuv ∈ HuP by setting
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λuv = (Θuπ)
−1(v). We may define
VuP = {v ∈ TuP | TuP(v) = 0} (7)
as the space of all vectors tangent to the fiber of P through u. This fact motivates the idea that
VuP is the “vertical” part of TuP. Hence, the direct sum decomposition
TuP = VuP⊕HuP (8)
together with the isomorphism between HuP and TpM justifies calling HuP the “horizontal”
part of TuP. Now, a connection on P allows for a unique separation of the vertical and the
horizontal part of TuP according to (8). Let g be the Lie algebra of G, then the connection is
defined as a g-valued one-form projecting TuP to VuP ∼= g.
Finally, we can define the horizontal lift of a parametrized curve C : [0, 1] → M. Let
C(0) ∈ M and u ∈ P with π(u) = C(0). A horizontal lift C¯ : [0, 1] → P of C satisfies: (i)
C¯(0) = u, (ii) π(C¯) = C, (iii) the tangent to C¯ at t ∈ [0, 1] is a member of HC¯(t). As we remarked
earlier, the isomorphism between HC¯(t) and TC(t)M justifies calling C¯ a horizontal lift of C.
One may say that C¯ is obtained by a parallel transport of u along C. Generally, the fact that
C(0) = C(1), that is, that C is a closed loop does not guarantee that the horizontal lift C¯ is a
closed loop as well. It might be the case that C¯ is not a closed loop and C¯(0) 6= C¯(1). In general,
if C(0) = C(1) then C¯(1) = C¯(0) g, where g ∈ G. The set of all g ∈ G which can be obtained in
this manner forms a subgroup of G called the holonomy group of the connection at point C(0).
We have now introduced the essential notions of fiber bundle mathematics and shall proceed
to their applications in gauge field physics.
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3 Gauge field theories
The previous section of this paper was devoted to the general mathematical concept of fiber
bundles. In this section we will discuss the advantages of using fiber bundles in physics. Our
demonstration is set in the realm of modern gauge field theories. It is in this area of physics,
perhaps the epitome of physics today, where our key assertion must be proven. We need to
show that the significant quantities of gauge field theories “live in bundle spaces” rather than
the spacetime base manifold.
3.1 General conceptual and terminological issues
Let us start with a list of the main concepts occuring in gauge field theories. It will be useful
to clarify the terminology needed for later discussions.4
(i) Covariance and invariance. The notions of covariance and invariance, which are crucial
to our considerations, have been given different definitions and interpretations throughout
the literature (in physics textbooks they are often used interchangeably). We shall use the
following terminology: covariance means form invariance of the equations of the theory
with respect to some group of transformations, the so-called covariance group. In gauge
field theories, we better speak of gauge covariance instead of gauge invariance. We shall
therefore make a distinction between covariance and a looser notion of a group invariance
of certain objects of a given theory, which does not involve the form of the equations.
(ii) Noether’s theorem. In order to understand gauge theories we must study the connection
between global symmetries and conserved quantities. Such a connection is established by
Emmy Noether’s first theorem:
Noether’s theorem: Let φi(x) be a field variable (i is the index of the
field components), then the covariance of the action functional S[φ] =∫ L[φi(x), ∂µφi(x)] d4x under a k-dimensional Lie group implies the existence
of k conserved currents.
(iii) Gauge postulate. The defining feature of gauge field theories is that they couple matter
fields and interaction fields dynamically. The beautiful idea of the gauge approach is
to start with a free theory, and then “derive” the structure of the coupling from the
assumption that the following postulate is satisfied:
Gauge postulate: The Lagrangian of a free matter field φi(x) should remain
invariant under local gauge transformations φi(x)→ φ′i(x) = φ′i[φi(x), αs(x)].
(iv) Gauge principle. The idea of gauging rests on postulating local gauge covariance instead
of the corresponding global Noether covariance. This idea5 is captured in the principle of
local covariance:
4We also address some terminological issues which were first presented in Lyre (1999).
5The general idea in a compact manner was first introduced by Hermann Weyl in his seminal paper from 1929;
cf. O’Raifeartaigh (1995) for historical remarks.
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Gauge principle: The coupling of the Noether current corresponding to the global
gauge transformations of the Lagrangian of free matter fields can be introduced
as the replacement of the usual derivative by the covariant derivative ∂µ → Dµ
which corresponds to local gauge transformations.
(v) Gauge transformations. We must distinguish between global gauge transformations
(GTG) and local gauge transformations (GTL). Regarding GTL, we must further dis-
tinguish two subcategories6:
a) matter field transformations, also called “gauge transformations of the first kind”
(GTL1), and
b) gauge potential transformations, also called “gauge transformations of the second
kind” (GTL2).
In quantum gauge field theories, the matter fields of transformations GTL1 describe the
fundamental fermionic particles of the standard model, such as leptons and quarks7,
whereas in gravitational gauge theories the “matter fields” are tangent vector fields associ-
ated with reference frames (that is, a material system representing an observer, measuring
rods, and clocks).
(vi) Bundle structure of gauge field theories. Modern gauge field theories are geometri-
cally characterized as principal fiber bundles P, where the gauge fields “live”, and their
associated vector bundles E, in which the matter fields “live”. Thus, in bundle theoretic
terminology, the distinction between GTL1 and GTL2 (and their respective fields) reflects
the distinction between E and P. Gauge potentials are connections on P, local sections
of E represent matter fields. The gauge group G is the structure group of the bundle and
its generators represent the gauge bosons. The group of local gauge transformations G
may be regarded as the automorphism group of P. Finally, the bundle curvature is to be
considered as the interaction field strength. We may, hence, compose a brief dictionary
for the bundle terminology of gauge theories as shown in the table on page 16.
(vii) Gauge freedom. It is common practice to call classical electrodynamics, i.e. Maxwell’s
theory, already a “gauge theory”. The reason is that the Maxwell equations are covariant
under specific GTL2. But this is certainly a misleading terminology; we shall rather refer
to it as a gauge freedom of the theory, whereas only the Dirac-Maxwell theory, or quantum
electrodynamics (20), respectively, combines the matter field and the gauge potential and,
hence, should be considered a true gauge field theory.
(viii) Gauge field theory. The characteristic feature of any gauge field theory is that it de-
scribes the coupling of a pure matter field theory to a pure interaction “field” (or, rather,
6Unfortunately, the terminology in the literature is not uniform. Some textbook authors already call global
and local gauge transformations transformations of the first and second kind (compare Ryder (1985, chap. 3.3), for
instance). But then they lack to distinguish between matter field and gauge potential transformations. Therefore,
we prefer the above terminology originally introduced by Pauli (1941).
7A more precise term would be “energy-matter fields”, since there may exist fundamental particle fields with
mass zero such as, perhaps, neutrinos. Most precisely, since there are massive gauge particles, such as W bosons,
we should speak about “energy-matter fields which are no gauge fields”. The reader may read our term “matter
field” as a shortform.
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Fiber bundle framework Gauge field theory
principal bundle P geometric arena of gauge potentials
connections on P gauge potentials
associated vector bundle E geometric arena of matter fields
local sections of E matter fields
structure group G gauge group
generators of G gauge bosons
automorphisms of P local gauge transformations GTL
vertical automorphisms of P pure gauge transformations
covariant derivative dynamical coupling
curvature interaction field strength
Table: Comparison of bundle theoretic and gauge theoretic terminology
gauge potential) theory. The structure of the coupling may be derived from the gauge
principle by imposing GTL covariance.8 The interaction potential, then, couples to the
matter field Noether current which is constructed from the corresponding GTG covariance.
Any gauge theory represents the geometry of a principal fiber bundle (and the associated
vector bundle). The gauge group is given by the structure group of the bundle.
Gauge field theory (for short: gauge theory): A theory which describes the cou-
pling of a matter field and an interaction field. It is based on a gauge principle
and uniquely determined by its underlying principal bundle structure.
3.2 Quantum gauge field theories
At least three of the four known fundamental interactions undoubtedly fit into the gauge the-
oretic framework. They are, moreover, suitably formulated as quantum field theories. For our
purposes, however, the quantum field theoretic aspect does not play any special role. The
argument for this is that the structure of the Lagrangian of a certain quantum field theory,
quantum electrodynamics (QED) for instance, is the same in the quantum field theoretic case
as in the case of its classical field theoretic counterpart. Also, the bundle structure, which is
our main concern here, remains the same in both cases. Thus, for our purposes QED is already
captured in the Dirac-Maxwell theory.9 In the following two subsections we first derive the
8 Recently, the physical content of the gauge principle has been questioned by several authors (Teller, 1997;
Redhead, 1998; Brown, 1999). In fact, the idea of imposing local gauge covariance leads, strictly speaking, to just
a special kind of bundle space coordinate transformation. At this point, the occurrence of a gauge connection
has no physical significance. Therefore, it can be argued that the gauge principle is not sufficient to “derive” the
coupling of matter and gauge fields and that a further physical assumption is needed. As one of us has pointed
out, this assumption may perhaps be formulated in terms of a gauge theoretic generalization of the equivalence
principle (Lyre, 2000).
9We should mention, however, that in the quantization process of gauge theories certain technical problems
arise. This is because the considered interaction theory includes a gauge freedom (thus, these problems refer
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Dirac-Maxwell theory from the gauge principle in order to demonstrate its practical realization.
Next, we shall describe the extension of the gauge approach to non-abelian gauge theories, the
so-called Yang-Mills theories.
3.2.1 Dirac-Maxwell theory
As a paradigm we consider the free Dirac field ψ(x) with the Lagrange density
LD = ψ¯(x) (iγµ∂µ −m) ψ(x). (9)
The free Dirac Lagrangian is covariant under global gauge transformations
ψ(x)→ ψ′(x) = eiqαψ(x), ψ¯(x)→ ψ¯′(x) = e−iqαψ¯(x) (10)
with some arbitrary constant phase parameter α and charge q. The Noether current correspond-
ing to the transformations (10) is given by
µ = −q ψ¯(x)γµψ(x). (11)
It satisfies the continuity equation,
∂µ
µ = 0, (12)
which expresses the conservation of charge. Following the gauge principle we replace the GTG
in (10) by their corresponding GTL1
ψ(x)→ ψ′(x) = eiqα(x)ψ(x), ψ¯(x)→ ψ¯′(x) = e−iqα(x)ψ¯(x) (13)
with a local, i.e. spacetime dependent phase function α(x). This leads to the coupling to an
interaction potential
A′µ(x) = −∂µα(x), (14)
which itself satisfies GTL2
Aµ(x)→ A′µ(x) = Aµ(x)− ∂µα(x). (15)
Applying (13), (14) and (15) to (9) yields to the covariant Dirac Lagrangian
L′D = LD + Lint (16)
with the coupling part
Lint = −µ(x)Aµ(x). (17)
In accordance with the gauge principle, this can directly be seen from the introduction of a
covariant derivative
∂µ → Dµ = ∂µ − iqAµ(x). (18)
Thus, applying (18) to (9) leads, again, to (16).
primarily to GTL2 instead of GTL1). But again, since these questions are not related to the bundle structure of
the theory we shall not be concerned with them.
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The gauge theoretic framework necessitates an active interpretation of the local gauge trans-
formations GTL. Note that “active” has the manifest meaning of “physically significant”. This
should not be confused with the distinction between point and coordinate transformations, which
is also sometimes referred to as a distinction between active and passive transformations. The
active character of GTL results from their changing the physical interaction-free situation (9)
into an interaction coupling (16). We will return to this issue in section 4.
Now, from the bundle theoretic point of view the vector field Aµ represents the components
of the connection one-form of a U(1) principal bundle. From (15) we may as well construct the
corresponding curvature tensor
Fµν(x) = ∂µAν(x)− ∂νAµ(x). (19)
Interpreting Aµ and Fµν as potential and field strength of the electromagnetic interaction, we
are motivated10 to complete the Lagrangian (16) to the full QED Lagrangian
LQED = LD + Lint + LM (20)
with the free Maxwell field part
LM = −1
4
Fµν(x)F
µν(x). (21)
The gauge theoretic feature of a dynamical coupling of two field theories into one combined
framework is reflected in the existence of two sorts of equations: equations of motion for the
matter fields (such as the Dirac equation which stems from LD or, in gauge covariant manner,
from LD + Lint) as well as interaction field equations (such as the Maxwell equations which
stem from LM or, in inhomogeneous form, from LM + Lint). In the combined framework we
call Aµ the gauge potential and Fµν the gauge field strength. Quantum gauge field theories are
usually formulated on a flat spacetime manifold, i.e. Minkowski spacetime R1,3. Therefore, the
principal fiber bundle structure of QED is P(R1,3, U(1)), indicating that QED is a U(1) gauge
theory.
3.2.2 Yang-Mills theories
The gauge approach can be extended to non-abelian unitary gauge groups.11 In the standard
model case we use SU(2)L of weak isospin, (unified in the elektroweak model with hypercharge to
SU(2)L×U(1)Y ), and SU(3)C as the color group of quantum chromodynamics.12 Let us briefly
indicate the analogous application of the gauge principle in the Yang-Mills case. Generally, in
order to construct an SU(n) gauge theory, we use the GTL1
Ψ(x) → Ψ′(x) = eignΛa(x)tˆaΨ(x) ≡ Uˆ(x) Ψ(x) (22)
10Of course, this “interpretation” is not enforced by the gauge principle; compare footnote 8.
11This was first done by C. N. Yang and R. L. Mills for the strong isospin SU(2)F (Yang and Mills, 1954); cf.
Mills (1989), O’Raifeartaigh (1995) for historical remarks.
12Again, in Yang-Mills theories certain peculiarities arise, which will not be of our concern here. Take for
instance the Higgs mechanism in the electroweak theory. It allows for non-zero masses of the gauge bosons by
symmetry breaking (since the gauge principle itself only leads to massless gauge bosons). As yet, however, there
is no experimental evidence for Higgs bosons.
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of the fundamental spinor representation Ψ = (..., ψi, ...)T , i = 1, 2...n analogous to (13). The
n2 − 1 operators tˆa generate the SU(n) group; each generator corresponds to a gauge potential
Baµ. We obtain the non-abelian generalization of (15), namely
B′aµ (x) tˆ
a = Uˆ(x) Baµ(x) tˆ
a Uˆ+(x)− i
gn
Uˆ(x) ∂µ Uˆ
+(x). (23)
In this case the covariant derivative is given by
∂µ → Dµ = ∂µ + ign Baµ tˆa, (24)
instead of (18) and the generalization of (19) yields
F aµν tˆ
a =
(
∂µB
a
ν − ∂νBaµ − gnfabcBbµBcν
)
tˆa = − i
gn
[Dµ,Dν ]. (25)
The bundle curvature F aµν measures, so to speak, the non-commutativity of the covariant deriva-
tives. In contrast to QED, the Yang-Mills Lagrangian
LYM = −1
4
F aµν(x)F
a µν(x). (26)
contains non-linear self-interaction terms of the kind “−gn∂BB2” and “g2nB4”, that is, the gauge
bosons carry charge themselves. The principal bundle structure is P(R1,3, SU(2)L×U(1)Y ) for
the electroweak interaction, and P(R1,3, SU(3)C) for chromodynamics.
We may now ask for the genuine objects of quantum gauge field theories. To be sure,
the application of the gauge principle shows the central role of the matter field ψ as well as
the gauge potentials Baµ. Without them the gauge argument is impossible, since local gauge
transformations GTL1 and GTL2 only take effect on them. Moreover, in order to derive the
equations of motion and field equations, the corresponding Lagrangians have to be varied with
respect to ψ and Baµ. Recall, however, that ψ and B
a
µ are no gauge invariant quantities and
are, therefore, not directly observable! By way of contrast, the gauge field strength F aµν is
gauge invariant – as well as quantities bilinear in ψ such as the Noether current. If we insist
on the central role played by ψ and Baµ, then this leads to the curious fact that, in gauge
theories, the genuine objects arising are themselves not directly observable. Thus, it seems that
we ourselves are faced with a dilemma – similar to Field’s one: the one horn being that if we
consider matter fields and gauge potentials as genuine objects of gauge field theories (because
they are indispensible in deriving the theory from the Lagrangian or from the gauge principle)
we did not choose directly observable quantities, but rather mathematical entities with no direct
physical significance.13 However, if we restrict ourselves to directly observable quantities only,
we must give up the whole idea of gauge theories, since per definition we can only apply the
gauge principle to non-gauge invariant quantities. This is the other horn of the dilemma.
13One crucial remark, however: in Yang-Mills theories the gauge potentials make a direct contribution to the
field strength tensor as can be seen from (25). Moreover, in the Yang-Mills field equations
(DµF
µν)a(x) = ∂µF
aµν(x)− gnf
abc Bbµ F
cµν(x) = aν(x).
the Baµ occur in direct combination with F
a
µν . Therefore, in this case their physical significance is clearly higher
than for the Aµ potential in the abelian case.
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We shall have to say more about this issue in the last section of this paper. For the time
being, we accept the first horn, that is, we accept the occurence of objects in gauge theories
(seemingly even the primary ones!) which, on the one hand side, are not directly observable, on
which, however, on the other hand side, the whole idea of gauging is obviously based and which
are, insofar, truly indispensible.
3.3 Gravitational gauge field theories
The fundamental quantum field theories of the electroweak and strong interactions clearly fit
into the gauge theoretic framework and possess a natural fiber bundle structure. No such clarity
can be found in the case of gravitational theories.14 Nevertheless, we will argue that even grav-
itational theories are best described in terms of gauge theories. As a consequence, we will show
that the underlying bundle structure allows to distinguish naturally the physically significant
objects and constituents of these theories from the merely mathematical ones. Our position
is by no means universal. In fact, orthodox relativists are likely to claim that a fiber bundle
formulation of general relativity (GR) is superfluous.15 This difference of opinion cannot be
easily resolved. However, we will try to demonstrate that a bundle formulation of GR facilitates
a better understanding of some outstanding philosophical issues in gravitational theories.
3.3.1 The gravitational gauge principle
Let us, first, apply the gauge principle in the gravitational case. For the sake of simplicity
we restrict ourselves to GR, which we shall present as a gauge theory of the homogeneous
Lorentz group SO(1, 3). The generality of our conception will not be affected because alternative
gravitational gauge theories may be founded on a gauge principle, too.16 We start with flat
Minkowski space R1,3, that is the interaction-free case in which no gravitation exists. Hence,
14By “gravitational theory” we henceforth mean any theory which is based on the equivalence principle. Besides
general relativity the class of gravitational theories includes unorthodox approaches of almost all imaginable gauge
groups of a four dimensional pseudo-Euclidean spacetime such as affine, linear and orthogonal groups, as well as
their corresponding covering and supersymmetric groups and the diffeomorphism group – cf. Ne’eman (1980), Hehl
et al. (1995). The first gauge theory of gravitation was presented by R. Utiyama (1956), using the homogeneous
Lorentz group SO(1, 3) as a structure group. Later on, F. W. Hehl and others considered the full Poincare´ group
ISO(1, 3) in a Riemann-Cartan spacetime with curvature and torsion (Hehl et al., 1976; Hehl et al., 1980). In
most of the cases the experimental testability of alternative theories of gravitation is beyond our current measuring
accuracy and, thus, the theoretical discussion is open for speculation.
15Compare, for instance, J. Ehlers: “ ... The formulation of the “field kinematics” of GR in terms of principal
bundles and their associated bundles allows one to consider GR as a gauge theory ... As far as I can see such
gauge considerations have not led to a deeper understanding of GR as such ... I at least fail to see that the use of
affine bundles with affine (in Cartan’s sense) connections changes this fact, nor does it help me to appreciate it
more deeply. ... Of course these remarks are not intended to pass any judgement on theories other than Einstein’s,
with or without gauge.” (Ehlers, 1973).
16For different types of gravitational gauge theories one basically has to plug in different gauge groups. In fact,
a more rigorous approach, strictly following the gauge principle, leads to a gauge theory of translations, since
the gravitational field couples to energy-matter, that is the corresponding Noether current associated with global
Poincare´ translation covariance.
Fiber Bundle Gauge Theories and “Field’s Dilemma” 21
we consider the free geodesic equation,
dθµ(τ)
dτ
= 0, (27)
for a four vector θµ(τ) = dx
µ(τ)
dτ
, tangent to a timelike curve xµ(τ). θµ ≡ θµ0 together with a
system of three spacelike vectors θµi represents a tetrad θ
µ
α = (θ
µ
0 , θ
µ
1 , θ
µ
2 , θ
µ
3 ). Since we wish to
derive gravity as a gauge theory of SO(1, 3), the GTL1 analogous to (13) have the form
θµα(τ) = Lˆ
β
α(x) θ
µ
β(τ) = e
(Mˆa)βαΛ
a(x) θµβ(τ) (28)
with a = 1...6 generators Mˆa of SO(1, 3) and spacetime-dependent transformation parameters
Λa(x) (we set x ≡ xµ(τ)). In analogy to the Yang-Mills case (22), the Latin index a “lives” in the
Lie algebra of the gauge group. Note further that we must distinguish external space-time indices
µ, ν . . . from internal tetrad indices α, β . . .. The former “live” in curved base space (holonomic
indices), whereas the latter “live” in local flat Minkowski space (anholonomic indices), i.e. in the
fibers of the tangent bundle of the SO(1, 3) principal bundle over spacetime. What is unique in
the case of gravitation is the existence of a natural mapping of the base space into the fiber space
(this mapping indices an isomporphism between the associated vector bundle and the tangent
bundle of the spacetime base manifold). The mapping allows us to distinguish between internal
and external indices. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the soldering of base space
and fibers.
Next, the gauge postulate, when applied to local Lorentz rotations of the tetrads, leads to a
covariant derivative ∇τ ,
d
dτ
θµα(τ) → ∇τθµα(τ) =
d
dτ
θµα(τ) + Γ
β
να
dxν(τ)
dτ
θµβ(τ). (29)
Γµ denotes the so-called Levi-Civita connection with Christoffel symbols as components. As in
(15), Γµ satisfies the GTL2
Γγνα(x) = Lˆ
γ
α(x) Γ
δ
νγ(x) (Lˆ
−1)γδ (x)− Lˆδα(x) ∂ν (Lˆ−1)γδ (x). (30)
Finally, (27) becomes the geodesic equation in curved spacetime
d
dτ
θµα(τ) + Γ
β
να
dxν(τ)
dτ
θµβ(τ) = 0. (31)
Now we may compare GR with the quantum gauge theories discussed above. Obviously, in
the gravitational case, the gauge potentials are given by the Levi-Civita connection Γµ. From
this we may form the curvature tensor Rµαβν , the so-called Riemann tensor, which represents
the gravitational field strength.17 A principal bundle with orthogonal structure group, such as
SO(1, 3), acting on tetradial frames, is called an orthonormal frame bundle (or tetrad bundle,
respectively). Note that tetrads are represented by tangent vector fields, i.e. sections in the
associated tangent vector bundle. Thus, in gravitational gauge theories, tetrads or reference
frames play a role analogous to the matter fields in quantum gauge theories.
17Per definition, the Christoffel symbols are symmetric in the lower indices Γµαβ = Γ
µ
βα. Once we give up this
restriction we may also have torsion (besides curvature) as a gravitational field strength in alternative gravitational
gauge theories.
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Observe that, from the gauge theoretic point of view, the metric tensor gµν is a derived
object which is built from the tetrads by means of gµν = ηαβθ
α
µθ
β
ν , with Minkowski metric
ηαβ = diag(−1, 1, 1, 1). Observe further that the Levi-Civita connection is not an independent
object of the theory either (we shall represent it in terms of derivatives of the tetrads). To say
that the connection is given in terms of the metric (which is given in terms of the tetrads) is
another way of expressing the soldering of the bundle space (where the connection lives) and
the base space (where the metric lives).
We may associate with any reference frame an observer in spacetime and, hence, a real
physical system of ponderable matter constituting measuring rods and clocks. Note that ob-
servers in spacetime theories are, usually, represented by mass points on timelike curves; cf.
Earman (1974). However, the gauge principle suggests that we represent observers by tetradial
frames, because the gravitational GTL1 act on tetrad indices. Moreover, this construction is
more general since it allows for a representation of fermionic matter.18
By definition, the gauge principle allows us to derive the gravitational equation of motion
(31). In GR, the field equations are given by the Einstein field equations which result from a
Lagrangian LGR = 12κ
√−gR + LMatter linear in the field strength. To be sure, a more general
gravitational gauge approach shall use a quadratic field Lagrangian; cf. Hehl et al. (1980). The
variation with respect to tetrads and connections as genuine fields leads to the Cartan equations,
the true Yang-Mills equations of gravitation. Einstein’s GR, therefore, only mimics the gauge
theoretic framework without really fitting in it.
3.3.2 Objects and principles in general relativity
The key idea of the paper is to point out that the fiber bundle formalism in gauge theories is
fruitful and that it clarifies the status of various theoretic objects. We claim that even when
gravitational gauge theories are concerned, the bundle language provides a natural distinction
between the physically significant structures and the merely mathematical ones.
Let us start with an important technical remark: as we mentioned earlier, the structure group
of the fiber bundle is considered to be the gauge group G. This terminology, though, can be seri-
ously misleading if we confuse the gauge group with the group G of local gauge transformations.
The latter one consists of spacetime-dependent group elements and is, thus, infinite-dimensional.
In general, G is a subgroup of the automorphism group Aut(P) of the gauge theory’s princi-
pal bundle P. The subgroup Go of G of just the vertical automorphisms is called the group
of “pure gauge transformations”. Locally, G looks like a semidirect product of the covariance
group of the base manifold and the structure group. Thus, we find G ∼= ISO(1, 3)×⊂SU(n) for
Yang-Mills theories in Minkowski space. In GR, however, Go is already a subgroup of Diff(M),
the covariance group of the manifold, i.e. we have G ∼= Diff(M)×⊂ISO(1, 3) ∼= Diff(M). Andrzej
Trautman states this point as follows: “... in the theory of gravitation, the group Go of ‘pure
gauge’ transformations reduces to the identity; all elements of G correspond to diffeomorphisms
of M.” (Trautman, 1980a; Trautman, 1980b, p. 306).
18The close connection between Dirac spinors and tetrads was already used in Weyl’s 1929 paper. From
the modern aspect of encountering a quantum gauge theory of gravitation, tetradial reference frames are also
important; cf. Rovelli (1991), Lyre (1998).
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This is the reason why it is difficult to distinguish between merely mathematical and truly
physical transformations and objects in GR. From our bundle point of view, however, we are
able to carry out this distinction quite naturally. We are faced with three different groups:
first, the covariance group of the spacetime manifold (Diff(M), in general). Since it reflects a
mere symmetry of the base space, we may safely consider it as purely mathematical. Second, the
structure groupG. It constitutes the fibers and has significance insofar as it reflects the geometric
arena of the connections. In 3.3.1 we chose G = SO(1, 3), but as we already mentioned, a more
rigorous gravitational gauge approach uses the Poincare´ translation group. It can be shown that
this group is isomorphic to the group of local diffeomorphisms (the reader may simply recall that
a local diffeomorphism is nothing but an infinitesimal point shift, i.e. a local translation). Thus,
in this case, we even get G = Diff(M). Third, there is the group of local gauge transformations
G. As we already emphasized, the GTL have physical significance because of their role in the
gauge theoretic framework: they reflect the existence of an interaction field coupled to the matter
field and they have, thus, an active interpretation. The curiosity of gravitational theories is that
both the covariance group as well as G are isomorphic to Diff(M) (and even G = Diff(M) for
translational gauge theories). The orthodox “pure base manifold” approach of GR, however,
does not allow to distinguish between G and G.19 This distinction is one of the most important
conceptual advantages of the fiber bundle formalism in GR. Similar ideas regarding gravitation
have also been expressed by John Stachel (1986).
The problem of the meaning of covariance within orthodox GR is not a minor one. The
reader may recall that there is a longstanding question of whether Einstein’s so-called principle of
covariance has any physical content20 and, hence, whether a meaningful distinction can be made
between absolute and dynamical objects of GR. One fruitful way of dealing with these questions
has been James Anderson’s proposal (Anderson, 1967). Intuitively, an absolute object is one
which remains invariant or unchanged by the interactions of the theory under consideration.
However, it may itself change or influence other objects. Examples are given by the Galilei
metric in Newtonian spacetime (NS) and the Minkowski metric ηµν in special relativity (SR).
The pseudo-Riemannian metric gµν in GR, on the other hand, represents a dynamical object.
To be sure, from our point of view the distinction between absolute and dynamical objects is
already captured in the difference between base space and fibers: dynamical objects “live” in
the fibers, whereas the absolute objects belong to the base manifold.
Now, Anderson as well as Michael Friedman proposed to use the distinction between absolute
and dynamical geometric objects to characterize spacetime theories (Anderson, 1967; Friedman,
1983); see also Trautman (1973). According to Anderson-Friedman any spacetime theory is
associated with a certain symmetry group, which is “... defined to be the largest subgroup of
the covariance group of this theory, which is simultaneously the symmetry group of its absolute
objects. In particular, if the theory has no absolute object, then the symmetry group of the
physical system under consideration is just the covariance group of this theory.” (Anderson,
19Concerning the group of pure gauge transformations Go, however, we must restrict our statement of the
physical significance of G: pure gauge transformations, surely, do not have a physical effect – see our remarks in
section 4.
20The prelude was given by Kretschmann’s early objections 1917 – see Norton (1993) for a general historical
account.
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1967, p. 87). This is the case in GR. Any of the above mentioned examples of spacetime
theories can be characterized by a symmetry group which preserves the absolute objects of the
theory. And conversely, any symmetry group accounts for a relativity principle, which in the
case of NS is the Galilei principle and in the case of SR the special relativity principle. For GR
the Anderson-Friedman approach has the advantage of showing that the principle of general
covariance has two different possible meanings: Firstly, considered as a statement about the
coordinate covariance of spacetime theories, it is indeed physically vacuous, since any spacetime
theory which represents spacetime as a differentiable manifold – such as NS, SR, and GR – may
be written in a covariant manner, i.e. form invariant under Diff(M). Secondly, Diff(M) arises
not only as a covariance, but simultaneously as a symmetry group of GR. This, however, is a
highly non-trivial feature of GR; it only obtains because GR does not contain absolute objects.
Therefore, this symmetry feature may be understood as the principle of general relativity. This
principle has a clear physical significance, unlike the principle of general covariance, which refers
to a merely mathematical (and not even characteristic) feature of GR. It is the advantage of the
Anderson-Friedman approach that it points out the crucial conceptual difference between these
two principles.21
From our bundle point of view, then, the confusion about the status of the “principle of
covariance” never arises. As a mere base space property, general covariance has no physical
significance whatsoever.22 On the other hand, to allow for a local gauge covariance in GR, that
is, to allow any observer to perform a transformation of local reference frames with elements of
G, is only possible by introducing a gravitational field to compensate for this local requirement.
This is the true physical content of the principle of GR which is, thus, best understood as a
gravitational gauge principle.23
To sum up: Gravitation can be understood as a gauge field theory proper. Its genuine
21Note, that the Anderson-Friedman approach is designed to classify spacetime theories in hierarchical order
according to their absolute objects (or their symmetry groups, respectively). However, “... as Robert Geroch
has observed, since any two timelike, nowhere-vanishing vector fields defined on a relativistic space-time are d-
equivalent, it follows that any such vector field counts as an absolute object...” (Friedman, 1983, footnote p. 59).
Clearly, this raises a problem for the issue of classifying theories. From our point of view, instead of using the
distinction between absolute and dynamical, we prefer to use the dichotomy between the merely mathematical
parts belonging to the base space and the truly physical parts belonging to the fibers. Indeed, one might even
call these parts absolute and dynamical. However, our distinction is not primarily intended to classify spacetime
theories, but rather to indicate their physical content. With regard to timelike curves we clearly see that they do,
indeed, belong to the physical part of GR, since they are associated with tangent vector fields, i.e. sections in the
associated vector bundle. In fact, reference frames, which may be associated with timelike vectors, turn out to be
the genuine objects of gravitational gauge theories (see our remarks in section 3.3.1). Thus, the bundle language
shows that the only “absolute” entity left in gravitational theories is the spacetime manifold itself – and its sole
non-trivial property is that it admits a differentiable structure (including global topology and the signature of its
metric).
22Observe, though, that general covariance is sometimes understood to encode the universality of the gravita-
tional coupling. In the framework of bundle geometries this is more adaequately expressed in the soldering of
bundle and base space: the gravitational interaction (bundle connection) represents the geometry of the spacetime
base manifold itself, and, hence, every physical object in spacetime is affected. Because of this feature, gravitation
is distinguished from other forces.
23However, as we already pointed out in footnote 8, the complete coupling structure of gauge theories is based
on the further assumption of an equivalence principle. This is a fortiori true in gravitational gauge theories.
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objects are tetradial reference frames, the bundle structure is given by the principal bundle of
orthonormal frames. Bundles in gravitational theories, although they seem to be superfluous due
to the soldering of base space and fibers, allow us to overcome conceptual problems concerning
the meaning of the various principles of relativity and covariance. At the same time they help
us to distinguish the truly physical parts of these kind of theories. In our opinion this proves
that even in the case of gravitation the fiber bundle formulation has clear advantages.
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4 The resolution of “Field’s dilemma”
In this last section we would like to conclude with a focused attempt to answer various questions
which arise in connection with Field’s dilemma.
4.1 Five questions
Question 1: How does the fiber bundle approach affect a distinction between the genuinely
physical and the merely mathematical parts of physics?
As we emphasized throughout the paper we believe that when gauge theories are formulated
in terms of fiber bundles the merely mathematical part should “live” in the base space while
the truly physical part is contained in the fibers. The base space is, essentially, a system of
coordinates. The need for such a “coordinatization” is a deep one – it is required whenever
we wish to define a physical interaction. Such a setting is mandated by the very concept of
measurement or observation: we can only observe and measure an interaction if we can identify
the location where it takes place. The coordinate system, though, as useful as it is and as
unavoidable for the application of the theory, should not be considered, in and of itself, a
physical phenomenon or a collection of physical objects.
Another way of formulating the distinction between the mathematical and the physical is
the following. Given a mathematical space which represents a gauge theory in its entirety one
should identify, first, the class of physical interactions which appear in the theory. The second
step is to find out what the formal properties of each interaction are, that is, those properties
which remain the same irrespective of location. These formal features can usually be described
as the operation of a group which is called the structure group. Finally, once the group is
defined, we construct the equivalence relation to which the group gives rise and describe the
total space as a principal bundle: the space is “quotientized” with respect to the structure
group. The base space is then presented as a way of “indexing” the various fibers in a smooth
way, as Sunny Auyang has pointed out (Auyang, 1995). This indexing system does not need
to have a physical interpretation and it is perfectly consistent with a relational approach to the
spacetime base manifold. As we remarked earlier, the two points of view, “coordinatization”
and “quotientization”, are mathematically equivalent with respect to the construction of fiber
bundles.
As we have seen the vertical connections are what allows us to compare the interaction in
different regions. In and of themselves they do not have any physical significance; they do,
however, allow us to see how does the interaction, which is schematically represented by the
operation of the structure group on the fibers, propagate from one region to the next.
Question 2: In what sense is the merely mathematical part, which we identified with the base
manifold structures, dispensable?
When we say that the base manifold is dispensable we do not mean that we can do physics
without a base manifold. We have had the occasion to see that whenever we wish to discuss
a local interaction we must use some coordinate system. Even mathematically, the very idea
of generalizing the direct product necessitates some way of covering the space with coordinate
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patches. There are, however, many different ways to coordinatize a space. These different
methods must be, in some sense, equivalent (in mathematical terms the building blocks of
one method must be obtainable by a diffeomorphism from those of the other). This, however,
does not mean that the methods are identical and, hence, we should not get rid of this “layer
of hidden structure” too easily. First, there might be a way of distinguishing between two
diffeomorphic systems. Second, as we have seen, there are cases where the diffeomorphisms are
“active transformations”, that is, they have a significant physical interpretation (this is the case,
for example, when gravity is construed as a gauge theory of local diffeomorphisms which are
mathematically isomorphic to local translations – see section 3.3). Only in those cases where the
diffeomorphisms do not have such an interpretation (for example, when they represent coordinate
transformations) are we free to say that the difference between diffeomorphic coordinate systems
can be ignored. It is precisely in this sense that a particular coordinate system is dispensable.
Any other diffeomorphic coordinate system would have served just as well giving rise to a theory
that is equivalent from a physical point of view.
Question 3: Are the fiber bundle formulations of physical theories “reasonably attractive”?
The question is whether our approach is aggressively revisionistic and philosophically motivated
or not. It is a rather important question with wide implications. To put it bluntly the question
is whether physics itself admits a natural distinction between the mathematical and the physical
or whether it takes a philosopher with a “hidden agenda” to accept the formulations we offer
because they permit such a distinction.
The first answer we would like to offer is that the theories in the standard model (including
gravitation) admit a canonical fiber bundle formulation. Moreover, the gauge approach seems
to provide the only “link” between quantum field interactions and gravitation.24 This aspect
of unification is certainly one of the strongest arguments for the use of fiber bundles in con-
temporary physics. This point, though, does not settle the issue. There is a more fundamental
reservation, that is felt by many physicists, that the hyphaluted mathematics of fiber bundles is
superficial, that layers of unnecessary mathematical structure are postulated, that fiber bundle
formulations are, simply, superfluous.
As we have seen before, one voice of dissent comes from the orthodox general relativity
theorists. This is not surprising. As the reader undoubtedly knows the founding fathers of
modern gravitational theories, headed by Einstein and Weyl, attempted to “geometrize” physics.
This ambition precludes any rough and ready distinction between the geometric (and hence, the
merely mathematical) and the physical. Indeed, as we remarked earlier even from a fiber bundle
theoretic point of view gravitation is a special case. In the case of theories of gravitation the
fibers are “soldered” to the base manifold. This means that the extra degree of freedom which,
in most cases, allows for the introduction of the operation of a structure group on the fibers
does not exist in the case of gravitation. Why, then, should we bother with the fiber bundle
formulation? Why not formulate gravitation in terms of manifolds with curvature (and torsion)
alone? An even more fundamental worry is that the fiber bundles which arise in gauge physics
are, in most cases, mathematically trivial, that is, they admit global sections and, therefore, they
24We do not consider approaches beyond the standard model such as supersymmetry, strings, etc.
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are isomorphic to direct products.25 Does all this not mean that the fiber bundle formulation is
superfluous?
We would like to offer a more general response to the claim that the physics of fiber bundles
is trivial. As we have mentioned earlier there are three types of fiber bundles:
(i) Trivial bundles with flat connections. In this case the connections are constant.
Galileian spacetime, for example, can be viewed as a fiber bundle of that type. It has
absolute time R – the bundle’s base space – and relative space R3 – the fibers with struc-
ture group O(3). The bundle is globally isomorphic to the direct product R × R3 and
therefore trivial. The flatness of the connections indicates space as a non-dynamical, i.e.
purely mathematical object. Regarding type (i) we can safely say that the fiber bundle
formulation is completely superfluous.
(ii) Trivial bundles with non-flat connections. In such cases the connections become dy-
namical quantities, but the bundle space is still isomorphic to a direct product. Both
quantum gauge theories and gravitation give rise to fiber bundles with non-flat connec-
tions. We would like to suggest that the existence of non-flat connections signifies the
physical non-triviality (as opposed to their triviality in the mathematical sense) of the
fiber bundles involved. Consequently, we believe that in those cases involving bundles
with non-flat connections the fiber bundle formulations are to be taken seriously. This
claim is, clearly, a contentious one; for the time being we have no conclusive proof that it
is defensible. Can we make do with an argument showing that in all the known cases the
existence of non-flat connections has physical significance? Certainly we cannot pretend
to have exhausted the issue in these pages.
(iii) Non-trivial bundles. Here, the bundle space is no longer isomorphic to a direct product.
In footnote 25 we used the opportunity to briefly discuss these cases already. There is no
doubt that, in cases which fall under this category, the bundle formulation is important,
fruitful and, perhaps, indispensible. But, as we mentioned in the above footnote, there
may be some doubt about the fundamental role these cases play in physics.
25 Let us mention, ever so briefly, that physical cases exist whose formulation in fiber bundle theoretic terms
is not trivial. Some of them are known in the literature under the terms geometrical or topological phases.
The best known case of this kind is the Aharonov-Bohm effect: The quantum phase of a particle’s wavefunction
parallel transported along a closed loop around a trapped magnetic field (such as a torroidal magnet, for instance)
shows a phase anholonomy which is experimentally tested via interference patterns (Aharonov and Bohm, 1959).
Anholonomy means that closed loops on the base manifold are lifted to open curves in the bundle. The presence
of an anholonomy prevents one from defining global cross sections. Therefore, a fiber bundle arising in connection
with the Aharonov-Bohm effect is non-trivial (a more general account of physical anholonomies is given by the
theory of Berry phases; cf. Shapere and Wilczek, 1989). Non-trivial bundles in quantum gauge theories may even
also indicate topological effects such as monopoles and instantons. Most of them, however, are not vindicated
experimentally (at least from a foundational point of view). This is the reason why we do not want to draw
decisive arguments from them. Moreover, as we mentioned already, we do not consider approaches beyond the
standard model to settle our point; see, for example, T. Y. Cao on grand unified and supergravity theories (Cao,
1997, chap. 11.3). Sure enough, the fundamental existence of such topological effects would make our arguments
concerning the significance of fiber bundles even stronger, if not non-refutable!
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Question 4: Do all the mathematical objects which are defined on the fiber space stand for
measurable interactions or observable physical objects?
Our aim in this paper was to show that we can assume that physical phenomena have measurable
consequences while, at the same time, affecting a distinction between the merely mathematical
and the truly physical. Our argument was an inductive one. We showed that our point of view
is consistent with current physics. Recall that the significant structures, from a physical point of
view, are matter fields, gauge potentials, gauge field strengths, and local gauge transformations.
Therefore, what we need to show is that all these cases involve only objects which live in the
fibers.
We shall discuss them one after another.
Matter fields. They are constructed as local sections in the vector bundles which are associ-
ated with principal bundles and happen to be the basic physical constituents of the gauge
principle. In the standard model the matter fields are given by the fundamental elemen-
tary particle fields; in gravitational gauge theories they are tangent vector fields of the
base manifold which are associated with reference frames. The matter fields are not gauge
invariant themselves; only bilinear quantities as the Noether current are directly observ-
able. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why we cannot do physics without them: first,
we may observe interference effects which cannot be explained from the quantities bilinear
in the matter field wave-functions. Second, they are indispensible for explaining the gauge
principle, since local gauge transformations GTL1 act on them. Therefore, matter fields
and the vector spaces in which they live (the fibers of the associated vector bundles) have a
certain physical significance. From their conceptual role in the gauge theoretic framework
we must even consider them the building blocks of gauge theories.
Gauge potentials. They are represented as coefficients of the connection forms which split the
tangent space of a principal bundle into a horizontal and a vertical part. For physicists
this concept is rather known as “covariant derivative”. They give rise to the gauge bosons.
Potentials are, again, not directly measurable, but in the case of non-trivial bundles they
will have observational consequences in terms of topological effects. They are, also, in-
dispensible for an understanding of the gauge principle, since local gauge transformations
GTL2 act on them.
Gauge field strengths. They are represented by the bundle curvature. As gauge invariant
quantities they are directly measurable as forces. With respect to our three-fold dis-
tinction of bundle types above, they give rise to type (ii) bundles which we considered as
sufficient for explanatory purposes (since non-flat connections are defined by non-vanishing
curvature).
Local gauge transformations. These transformations give rise to the structure group G and,
hence, to the group of local gauge transformations G (recall our remarks in section 3.3.2).
The postulate of local gauge covariance, as it is used in the gauge principle, determines
the form of the interaction coupling of the Lagrangian (the GTL1 lead to the existence
of an interaction gauge potential with transformations GTL2; in other words, the GTL
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determine the dynamics).26 In our opinion this constitutes a strong argument in favour of
an active interpretation of local gauge transformations.
On the other hand, the subgroup Go of G of the so-called pure gauge transformations has
no physical significance, since these transformations merely transform ‘vertically’ within
an equivalence class of fiber points. In other words, pure gauge transformations preserve
the connections. It is, of course, unavoidable to have an element of redundancy within the
bundle framework, since the whole idea of the generalization of the direct product is rested
on the existence of a hidden layer of structure, namely the gauge group equivalence classes,
as we pointed out in section 2.1. When we speak about active local gauge transformations,
we mean that they have a vertical as well as a horizontal component (as encoded on
the covariant derivative). Note also, that our usage of “active” here essentially means
“physically effective”, i.e. changing the physical situation. This, indeed, is the case when
local gauge transformations are concerned. Because of the gauge principle, the postulate
of local gauge covariance can be satisfied only by introducing an interaction gauge field.
And this changes the physical situation.
In this respect we want to emphasize that the common view of interpreting point transforma-
tions as active transformations raises a different issue. Those, who regard point transformations
as active, in the above-mentioned physical sense, are likely to regard points and spaces as en-
tities. This touches on the issue of relationalism/substantivalism which we will address in our
last question.
Question 5: Are we committed to substantivalism with respect to bundle spaces?
Substantivalism with respect to fiber bundle spaces is the doctrine that bundle spaces, their
constituents, bundle space points, and, hence, also the base space itself, are genuine individu-
able entities. This position raises many interesting philosophical questions. One has to admit
that, at a first glance, the fiber bundle formalism can be utilized to justify this most extreme
substantivalist position. Our point, though, was a different one. We wanted to affect a distinc-
tion between the truly physical parts of fiber bundle gauge physics and those which are not; and
we identified the physical parts with the various fields and transformations arising in the fibers
(as listed under the previous question). This point, however, does not commit us to substan-
tivalism. In fact, the distinction we make between the mathematical and the physical parts of
gauge field theories does not commit us to any view about the ontological status of mathematical
entities (one may think of the spacetime metric in GR as a physical object without taking it
to be a substance). To be sure, questions concerning the status of fiber spaces are of a novel
kind and certainly very interesting.27 Observe, though, that this issue is not logically related
to our approach. We are not committed to the view that fiber spaces are themselves physically
26Again, as we remarked several times, the true “determination” of the gauge potential as being physical neces-
sitates a further assumption, which may be formulated in terms of a generalized equivalence principle (compare
footnote 8).
27It is possible to develop a bundle space hole argument to rule out bundle space substantivalism (Lyre, 1999)
in analogy to the well-known spacetime hole argument (Earman and Norton, 1987); compare Earman (1989,
chap. 8-9) also for comments on the hole argument and Field’s substantivalism.
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significant; we rather maintain that the functions living therein, and not the spaces, are genuine
physical objects.
4.2 Conclusion
We hope to have demonstrated that our approach is one way of resolving Field’s dilemma. Our
method was an inductive one. By looking carefully at a whole collection of gauge theories we
noticed that they all admit a natural distinction between the physical and the mathematical
parts. This does not strike us as an accidental fact, although, we have no way of proving
it conclusively. Therefore, on the basis of our observations, we conclude that we obtained a
general result: the physically significant objects and quantities can be represented as functions
which are defined on the fibers (which does not mean that, conversely, all of the structures in the
fibers are physically significant). Our question of distinguishing between the mathematical and
the physical parts was originally motivated philosophically. But it seems plausible to assume
that the evolving degree of unification in physics should entail a natural distinction between
these both parts in terms of the architecture of our fundamental theories itself. Fiber bundle
gauge theories, we believe, are a crucial step in this direction.
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